bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
7-15-1999

The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and the Case Against an
Absolute Prohibition on Carrying Concealed Weapons
Christopher R. McFadden

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
McFadden, Christopher R., "The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and the Case Against an Absolute
Prohibition on Carrying Concealed Weapons" (1999). NIU Test. 399.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/399

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

The Wisconsin Bear Arms Amendment and

the Case Against an Absolute Prohibition on
Carrying Concealed Weapons
CHRISTOPHER R. MCFADDEN*

This is not the end of the issue. This is just the beginning.'
INTRODUCTION
"The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense,
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."2 With those words, in
November 1998, the voters of Wisconsin joined the ranks of forty-three other
states that have established a constitutional right to possess and carry
weapons-a right "without which," according to historian Thomas Macaulay,
"every other is insufficient."3 The Bear Arms amendment, enacted 150 years
after the state's original constitution was adopted, was a long time coming.

Similar proposals had repeatedly died in the state assembly, but the 1994

elections swept into the Legislature numerous pro-gun candidates, who were
angered and emboldened by various cities' attempts to prohibit citizens from

keeping or carrying handguns completely.4 Shortly thereafter, the Legislature
once again moved forward with an attempt to enact a Bear Arms amendment.
Pursuant to the requirements for amending the state constitution,

legislators approved identical versions of the amendment in two consecutive
legislative sessions over the course of three years, and it was placed on the

*
Third-year student, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. Harvard
University, 1997. Law clerk to Judge Ira DeMent, Middle District of Alabama, 2000-01.
Thanks to Professor Daniel D. Polsby for his encouragement. Any errors are mine alone.
1. Gun Advocates to Fight Madison Ordinances, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec.
8, 1994, at B3, available in 1994 WL 8301638 (quoting Jim Fendry, director of the Wisconsin
Pro-Gun Movement, in response to passage of Madison Common Council's gun control
ordinances).
2. Wis. CoNsT. art. I, § 25.
3. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT 169 (1994).
4. See SHAUN HAAS, WISCONSIN LEGsL.ATIvE COUNCIL, ANALYsIS OF 1995 AsSEMBLY
JOINT RESOUrION 53 AND 1995 SENATE JOINT RESOUION 7, RELATING TO THE RIGiT TO KEEP
AND BEAR ARMS (FIRST CONSIDERATION) 3 (Oct. 11, 1995) (discussing previous versions of
proposed amendments) [hereinafter HAAS]; Dennis McCann, Hello, 911? Can I Exchange
These Gifts?, MILwAUKEE J.& SENTINEL, Jan. 3, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 16090339
(calling legislators and governor "wholly owned subsidiaries of the NRA').
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November 3, 1998 ballot.5 In the end, seventy-four percent of voters
supported the measure, prompting the triumphant declaration of Jim Fendry,

director of the NRA-affiliated Wisconsin Pro-Gun Movement, that "Wisconsin citizens have again said they don't want tough gun restrictions. We're all
in favor of gun control laws, but they don't want tough gun restrictions." 6
Some materials, without offering much analysis, have asserted that the

Bear Arms amendment is "primarily ceremonial, and is unlikely to have any
real effect on most people."7 However, the non-partisan government staff
attorneys and legal draftspeople who helped legislators write the Bear Arms

amendment disagreed.

In two analyses, which were circulated among

legislators to help them author an amendment properly worded to effectuate
their intent, senior staff attorneys with the state assembly's Legislative
Council ("LC") stated that certain "current criminal laws on 'arms' could be
determined to be unclear or not limited enough in relation to the right to keep
and bear arms." '.[T]here is no doubt," according to one analysis, "that there
are numerous issues (based on the specific wording and scope of the
constitutional language and each statute regulating firearms or other 'arms')
that can and probably will be litigated."9 Despite this warning, the Legislature

5. See WiS. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (detailing requirements for amending state
constitution). The Bear Arms amendment was approved on first consideration by the Assembly
on March 26, 1996 and the Senate on May 8, 1996. It was then approved on second
consideration by the Assembly on January 28, 1997 and the Senate on March 12, 1998, thereby
allowing for its submission to the Wisconsin voters. 2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1995-1996
SESSION) 1031 (Mar. 26, 1996), 1 SENATE JOURNAL (1995-1996 SESSION) 802 (May 8, 1996),
2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1997-1998 SESSION) 38 (Jan. 28, 1997), 1SENATE JOURNAL (1997-1998
SESSION) 513 (Mar. 12, 1998).
6. Jim Stingl, Gun Amendment Handily Wins State Voters' Approval, MILWAUKEE
J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 1998, at 16, available in 1998 WL 14049885. A majority in every
county supported the measure, with 1,196,622 citizens voting in favor and 415,911 in
opposition. See Election 98 (Wisconsin) Results, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov.5, 1998, at
14, availablein 1998 WL 14051408.
7. Referendums on Ballot, THE DALLY PRESS (Ashland, Wis.), Oct. 31, 1998, at 7
(advising readers that, "[i]n the final analysis, this amendment is primarily ceremonial, and is
unlikely to have any real effect on most people. Those who feel passionately about the right to
bear arms should vote for the amendment, while those whose primary concern is with gun safety
should vote against it"). For a more thoughtful discussion of how various state courts have
interpreted their own constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms, including
those similar in language to Wisconsin's, see David B. Kopel, Clayton E. Cramer & Scott G.
Hattrup, A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to BearArms in State Supreme Courts,68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1177 (1995).
8. DON SALM & SHAUN HAAS, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DISCUSSION OF
POSSmLE EFFECTS OF 1997 SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 5, RELATING TO THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMS (SECOND CONSIDERATION), ON SELECTED STATUTES REGULATING "ARMS," SUCH
AS FIREARMS 9 (Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter SALM & HAAS].
9. Id. at 12.
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adopted a Bear Arms amendment that rendered certain statutes fatally
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
By drawing upon primary documents and statements by legislators and
legislative draftspeople, this article makes the case that Wisconsin's oldest
gun control statute, which absolutely prohibits all law-abiding citizens from
carrying concealed weapons," should be invalidated as one of those
"impermissible tough gun restrictions" that unduly infringe upon the right of
Wisconsin citizens to bear arms. The statute in question, Section 941.23,
dates back to 1872" and states that "[a]ny person except a peace officer who
goes armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon" is guilty of a misdemeanor. 2 It allows no exceptions for carrying of concealed weapons at any
time or place, in any manner, or for any reason. Furthermore, its broad
definition of "dangerous weapon" includes "any firearm, whether loaded or
unloaded" and "any other device or instrumentality which ... is calculated or
likely to produce death or great bodily harm."'13 All constitutional provisions
must be construed to implement their intent, and, as this article suggests, the
broad prohibitions contained in Section 941.23 are incompatible with the
legislative intent and voter understanding of the Bear Arms amendment.
In arriving at this conclusion, Part I looks at the sources Wisconsin
courts typically use to ascertain legislative intent. Because no state agency
keeps transcripts of legislative debates or public hearings, courts evaluating
cases of first impression 4 examine other "intrinsic" evidence, including
materials archived in the amendment's legislative drafting file," and
"extrinsic" evidence, such as informational pamphlets and newspaper articles
circulated among voters. As Part I explains, the Legislature sought to
establish the broadest possible right to keep and bear arms, one that allows for
only minimal governmental infringement. Ample material shows that the
amendment's "primary purpose," according to its drafters, was "the establishment of afiundamentalindividual right to keep and bear arms for 'any lawful

10. See Wis. STAT. § 941.23 (1997).
11. See 1872 Wis. Laws ch. 7, § 1.
12. Wis. STAT. § 941.23 (1997).
13. Id. § 939.22(10) (1997) (defining dangerous weapon).
14. Regular Westlaw database searches reveal that, as of mid-September 1999, no cases
have raised state constitutional challenges to Section 941.23. Search of Westlaw, WIS-CT
Library, US File (Sept. 1, 1999). One unreported case, however, has found that Section 941.23
does not violate the Second Amendment. See State v. Knies, 371 N.W.2d 430, No. 84-1455-CR
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
15. These materials are kept at state's Legislative Reference Bureau ("LRB") office in
Madison. They include handwritten notes from legislators, directions to LRB staff, memoranda
written by LRB drafters, and analyses of proposed legislation.
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purpose."' 6 Statutes would be found constitutional only if the state articulated
"a compelling public safety reason" for them. 7 In other words, the statutes

would have to survive heightened judicial review, if not strict scrutiny.
Additionally, and more importantly for this analysis, legislators (1)
scrapped an earlier version of the Bear Arms amendment that expressly
allowed the prohibition of carrying concealed weapons; (2) rejected subsequent attempts to reintroduce such language in later drafts;"8 and (3) gave no
indication that Section 941.23 should remain valid. 9 Worse, the statute's
overbroad scope is not tailored to meet a specific, compelling state interest. 20
These pieces of evidence all suggest that the Bear Arms Amendment's broad
general applicability should trump Section 941.23, and it should be declared
unconstitutional.
Part II, then, briefly serves two purposes. First, it seeks to allay fears
that the invalidation of Section 941.23 will hearken the return of a "Wild
West" atmosphere in Wisconsin. Despite the prevalent public belief, reliable
empirical research suggests that allowing law-abiding citizens to carry
concealed weapons will not lead to additional acts of random, senseless
violence, but, rather, will deter criminal behavior. Second, this part explains
that the Wisconsin Legislature, even in the face of the Bear Arms amendment,
remains free to enact reasonable regulations that are less restrictive than
Section 941.23's and, thus, balance between the individual right to carry
concealed weapons and the societal interest in crime prevention. The right to
bear arms is not absolute, and it may yield to numerous narrowly tailored
restrictions similar to those time, place, and manner regulations commonly
employed in First Amendment jurisprudence. In short, the right may be
regulated, though not denied entirely. Finally, this article concludes that
Section 941.23 is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to
address a specific, compelling state interest and, therefore, must be repealed.

16. HAAs, supra note 4, at 6 (emphasis supplied).
17. See Jeff Mayers, GOP Gives Boost to Referendums, WIS. ST. J. (Madison, Wis.),
June 10, 1998, at 5C, available in 1998 WL 5873800; see also HAAS, supra note 4, at 3
(amendment establishes fundamental right); SAI.M & HAAS, supra note 8, at 4 (courts examining

regulation of fundamental rights apply strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny) (citing Brandmiller

v. Arreola, 544 N.W.2d 894 (Wis.1996)).

18.
19.
20.

See infra notes 71-88, 97-107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
See infra note 143-45 and accompanying text.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND VOTER UNDERSTANDING DEMONSTRATES
THAT THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS WOULD PROTECT A RIGHT TO CARRY
CONCEALED WEAPONS

The text of Wisconsin's Bear Arms amendment is facially ambiguous.
It states that the people have a right to "bear arms," but the meaning of this
proviso is not clarified.2 In fixing reasonable parameters for the right to carry
weapons, Wisconsin courts will follow basic rules of statutory construction.

Their paramount goal is to determine the intent of the framers and the voters.22
To meet this goal, courts will (1) consider the historical atmosphere in which
the amendment was written;23 and (2) examine legislative debates, hearings,
and statements made to voters about the amendment's purpose.' Ample
material in the Bear Arms amendment's drafting file,25 along with newspaper
articles published from 1995 to 1998, suggests that Section 941.23 lies beyond
the boundaries of the permissible gun control regulations contemplated by
legislators and voters.
A.

HISTORICAL EVENTS PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT'S FRAMING

By examining the historical events preceding the framing of the Bear
Arms amendment, one senses a general antipathy among legislators and voters
towards wide-ranging gun restrictions. It is clear that the push for a statewide
Bear Arms amendment was in direct response to attempts by national, state,
and local governments to limit the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep and

bear weapons throughout Wisconsin. By mid-1994, Wisconsin citizens feared

21. LC attorneys advised the Legislature on several occasions of this ambiguity. See
SALM & HAAS, supra note 8, at 6 (speculating as to text's meaning); HAAS, supra note 4, at 6-7

(same).
22. See State ex rel Ekern v. Zimmerman, 204 N.W. 803, 805 (Wis. 1925) ("the
purpose of construction of a constitutional amendment is to give effect to the intent of the
framers and of the people who have adopted it").
23. See Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 150 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Wis. 1967) (court
should interpret constitutional provisions "in view of the evil which existed calling forth the
framing and adopting of such instrument").
24. See State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 152 (Wis. 1986) (public statements of
legislators are persuasive authority for determining legislative intent); State ex rel Martin v.
Heil, 7 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Wis. 1942) ("consideration should be given to the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention itself"); see also Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes,
390 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ill. 1979) (newspaper articles are relevant to determining voters'
understanding of constitutional amendments). Throughout its analysis, the court will be careful
not to interpret any part of the amendment in a manner inconsistent with the general intent and
understanding of the legislators and voters. See Kayden, 150 N.W.2d at 452.
25. The drafting file is maintained by the LRB in Madison. Material within the file is
used by courts to aid statutory interpretation. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Roberta Jo W., 578
N.W.2d 185, 189 (Wis. 1998); State v. Bizzle, 585 N.W.2d 899,903 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
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that their right to keep weapons was under attack. The cities of Milwaukee,
Kenosha, and Shorewood were holding referenda to consider banning the
possession or carrying of handguns within city limits.26 Wisconsin Attorney
General Jim Doyle was calling for three-pronged statewide legislation that
allowed judges to issue "firearms orders" that categorically restricted certain
individuals from owning weapons, increased license fees for gun dealers, and
imposed stiffer penalties for violations of existing statewide laws against
carrying weapons. 27 Meanwhile, the Brady Bill,2" with its waiting periods and
background checks, was moving through Congress. These events all
frustrated those law-abiding Wisconsin citizens who were intent on preserving
their freedom to keep and bear arms. Then, according to the Milwaukee
Journal & Sentinel, along came the chief "spark for renewed interest" in
prophylactic anti-gun control measures-the action of the Madison Common
Council.29
To supporters of gun rights, the council's actions were Kafkaesque. In
1993, Madison voters defeated a citywide referendum to outlaw all handguns
within city limits.3" The defeated proposal was unprecedented. It went
beyond incidental regulation and sought complete prohibition of the freedom
to bear arms. Handguns, essentially, would have been declared illegal.3
However, undeterred by the referendum's outcome, the Common Council
snatched victory from the jaws of defeat. One year later, by a one-vote
majority, the council enacted a sweeping ordinance restricting the right to
keep handguns as well as to carry them. In addition to outlawing the
possession of all guns with barrels less than four inches long, the council
required all residents--as well as any person passing through the city-to lock
their guns when not in use and to transport them at all times unloaded and
encased anywhere within city limits.32 These restrictions applied to the
26. Cf. Keeping the Gun Lobby in Check MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 1994,
at A6, available in 1994 WL 8298911 (criticizing the gun lobby for advocating "the insane
proliferation of guns"). The Milwaukee and Kenosha referenda, which were binding, were
defeated. The Shorewood referendum, which was merely advisory, was approved. See id.
27. See generally Mary Zahn & Cary Spivak, Policy Debate, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 1994, at 1A, availablein 1994 WL 8275883.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1996).
29. Limited Control: Gun Groups Would Inhibit Local Rule, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 1994, at 12A, availablein 1994 WL 8303060; see also Dennis Calkins, Let
Voters Decide on Arms, CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at 3C, availablein 1997 WL 7051137
(arguing that Madison Common Council thwarted will of the people).
30. See Most at Public Hearing Take Shots at Proposed Gun Ban in Madison,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, May 17, 1994, at 5, available in 1994 WL 8286178.
31. See id.
32. See generallyMadisonBans Some Pistols, Rifles, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec.
7, 1994, at AI, availablein 1994 WL 8301858.
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transportation and bearing of all types of firearms, as did similar
transportational restrictions enacted by more than twenty other communities
around the state. 3

This maze of activity throughout Wisconsin embodied all that gun rights

advocates feared: the government appeared to be disarming its citizens
against their will. 34 "People in politics feel they are a ruling class and lose

track of what every guy or gal has on their mind," complained one weary
northern Wisconsin resident,35 and Governor Tommy G. Thompson joined

sportsmen and hunters in calling the restrictions anathema to liberty and
urging their repeal.36 A Bear Arms constitutional amendment was needed,
these supporters argued, in order to protect against the "elimination of the
rights of citizens" by "a small radical group"-something that had "never
happened before" in the state's history. 37 The attitude of the Bear Arms
amendment's supporters is best captured by one citizen's answer to a
rhetorical question posed by Representative Peter Bock (D-Madison), as
quoted in an editorial by the Madison Capital Times. "Why expand all this
effort to enshrine the right to own a gun," Representative Bock asked, "when
Wisconsin provides no constitutional right to food or housing or health care?"
The response was direct and succinct: "I suspect it's because no [branch of
government] in Wisconsin has yet enacted local ordinances to bar people from
eating, owning houses or visiting doctors. 38
33.

See generally Amy Rinard & Steven Walters, Cities Target Gun Bill Loophole,

MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 12850427.

34. Because the Second Amendment does not apply to the states, a state is free to enact
any gun restrictions it chooses. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); State v.
Friel, 508 A.2d 123, 125 (Maine 1986) (Second Amendment "operates as a restraint solely upon
the power of the national government"). Moreover, notwithstanding the Second Amendment,
the federal government may enact various gun control laws under its police powers, the
Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 176 (1939) (upholding restrictions on possession of weapons not having "some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia"); United
States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding nationwide assault weapons
restrictions); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942) (upholding restrictions on
transportation of firearms). For additional discussion, see infra notes 50-57, 61-64, 67-70 and
accompanying text.
35. Pat Schneider & David Callender, Gun Owners Fire Back at City's Push, CAPITAL
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1995, at 1A,availablein 1995 WL 13727699.
36. See Jeff Mayers, Thompson to Sign Gun Bill OverridingMadison's Law, WIS. ST.
J. (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 11, 1995, at 3B, available in 1995 WL 13727258 (hunters are
"worried about traveling through Madison"); Daniel Bice, Assembly Backs Gun Law Limits,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2999621 (preemption bill
would permit hunters to "feel free" as they travel throughout Wisconsin).
37. See Matt Pommer, Right to Guns a 'Heart,Soul' Issue: Senator, CAPrTALMTIMES,
Oct. 19, 1995, at 1A,availablein 1995 WL13726484.
38. Richard S. Russell, Gun Amendment Makes Sense, CAPITALTIMEs, Feb. 7, 1997,
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It is difficult to extract specific principles from historical analyses.
Nevertheless, the response of Wisconsin legislators and citizens to gun control
measures supports two general propositions. First, it evinces a hostility to
inflexible, blanket gun control laws. While citizens may have agreed that less
restrictive limitations on bearing arms were necessary and perhaps even
desirable, they adamantly opposed total prohibitions. Second, the response
suggests a willingness to overturn existing statutes, such as Madison's, that
unduly burdened the ability to bear arms. Quite simply, the public feared
comprehensive governmental gun control legislation. This public reaction
should weigh against upholding broad gun control regulations in the face of
the Bear Arms amendment, for the Bear Arms amendment was advanced by
legislators who presumably were aware of these public concerns. More
specifically, as this next Subpart explains, courts should not find that Section
941.23, which prevents all citizens from bearing all types of concealed
weapons at any time, any place, or for any purpose, was intended to survive
the Bear Arms amendment's passage.
B. INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND VOTER
UNDERSTANDING

Constitutional guarantees, of course, restrict governmental power.39
Throughout the Bear Arms amendment's drafting process, Wisconsin
legislators seized on every opportunity to broaden its scope and to curtail the
Legislature's ability to restrict the carrying of weapons. On September 1,
1995, the original text of the Bear Arms amendment was introduced as 1995
Assembly Joint Resolution ("A.J.R.") 53. It read:
Every individual, except an individual restricted in accordance with state or federal law, has the right to keep and
bear arms for any lawful purpose including for security or
defense, for hunting and for recreational use, except that the
manner of bearingarms may be regulated in accordance
with state law.'

at 12A, available in 1997 WL 7051746 (letter to the editor).
39. See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 76 (1989) (interpreting Second Amendment).
40. 1995 A.J.R. 53, Ist. Sess. (Wis. 1995), noted in 2 ASsEMBLYJoURNAL(1995-96

SESSION) 428 (Sept. 1, 1995) (emphasis supplied). When read on second consideration during
the 1997-98 legislative session, A.J.R. 53 was re-named 1997 A.R. 11. The amendment's text
remained the same.
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Analyses by the LC and the non-partisan Legislative Reference Bureau
("LRB")-the state government's legal advisory agency-pointed out that the
original text of A.J.R. 53 created a limited right that was dependent on the
Legislature's failure to declare certain purposes for carrying weapons
"unlawful." In response, the Legislature made numerous deliberate drafting
changes, all of which were intended to create a right to bear arms that is
independent of positive law."' Moreover, while the original draft expressly
reserved the state's ability to regulate "the manner of bearing arms," i.e.,
banning the carrying of concealed weapons, the Legislature removed this
clause from the text and rejected subsequent attempts to return it. 42 Legislators, in fact, suggested that sweeping restrictions on carrying concealed
weapons conflicted with the amendment's wide-ranging purpose and scope.4 3
As enacted, the Bear Arms amendment unconditionally states that "[tihe
people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting,
recreation or any other lawful purpose. ' '4 The legislative history accompanying this language indicates that sweeping restrictions of the right to bear arms
would be repealed. Section 941.23, which is not narrowly tailored to address
a specific, compelling state interest, is precisely such a sweeping encroachment.45 Therefore, it should be found unconstitutional.
1.

Creatingthe BroadestPossible Right to Keep and Bear Arms

Because the Second Amendment applies only to the federal government
and not to the states, a state without a Bear Arms amendment is free to enact
any gun regulations it chooses.' While section 2 considers the effects of the
Legislature's removal of the clause expressly allowing regulation of the
manner in which citizens may bear arms, this section considers several key
legislative drafting choices designed to remove all state anti-gun restrictions
"within the limits allowed by federal law as the supreme law of the land. 47

41.
42.
43.

44.

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra notes 86-107.
See infra notes 114-26 and accompanying text.
Wis. CoNsT. art. 1, §25.

45. See infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
46. See HAAS, supra note 4, at 1 (citing State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123, 125 (Maine
1986)); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD

D. ROTUNDA, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW § 10.2, 340-41 (5th ed. 1995).
47. H. RUPERT THEOBALD, DRAFTER'S NOTE FROM THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU 1 (Feb. 1, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 DRAFTER'S NOTE]. This note was reprinted in

subsequent analyses by the LRB and is contained in the Bear Arms amendment's legislative file,
thus comprising part of the amendment's official legislative history.
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First, the Legislature modified the original draft of A.J.R. 53 by
providing that "[t]he people have" the right to keep and bear arms, rather than
stating that "every individual" has such a right.4 8 Due to this textual change,
Wisconsin's amendment's use of "people" mirrors that of the Second
Amendment.4 9 Thus, supporters of gun control regulations are likely to argue
erroneously that the Bear Arms amendment was meant simply to follow the
Second Amendment, which has been held to protect only a non-fundamental
collective right of the states to equip and assemble a militia-not the right of
individual citizens to own weapons.5 ° This interpretation of the Second
Amendment has found uniform support among federal courts.5
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is one of several state
courts that has adopted a similar reading of its state constitution's bear arms
amendment. For example, in Commonwealth v. Davis,5 2 the court found that
its state constitution was "not directed to guaranteeing individual ownership
or possession of weapons" and only insured a collective right of the public as
a whole to bear arms in assistance of the state militia during emergencies.
Because military functions are now performed by the National Guard, the
court found that any state gun control regulation was permissible if enacted
as "part of a large regulatory scheme to promote the public safety."" a By the
logic of Davis, the Wisconsin Bear Arms amendment would merely guarantee
a National Guard. It would place no limits on state-based gun control
regulations, provided that they were justified under rational basis review and
neither arbitrary nor capricious.54
Yet such an interpretation of Wisconsin's Bear Arms amendment cannot
stand. By stating that "the people" have a right to keep and bear arms, the
amendment's drafter, former Assembly Speaker David Prosser (R-Appleton),
intended to offer not less, but more protection than was contemplated under
48. Assembly Substitute Amendment 1,2d Sess. (Wis. 1996), to 1995 A.J.R. 53, 1st
Sess. (Wis. 1995), noted in 2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1995-96 SESSION) 994 (Mar. 25, 1996)
(emphasis added).
49. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II with Wis. CoNsT. art. I, §25.
50.

See, e.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101-02 (9th Cir. 1996); Quilici v. Village

of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261,270 (7th Cir. 1982). Because the Second Amendment has not
been incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction on state power, it is not
considered fundamental. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 340.
51. See Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) ("lower federal courts have
uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than an individual
right.") But see United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 600-10 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(Second Amendment protects individual right to keep and bear arms).
52.

53.

54.

343 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1976).

Id. at 849.

See id.; see also Kopel, Cramer & Hattrup, supra note 7, at 1204-29 (discussing

application of rational basis review to gun control laws in three states).
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both the original draft of A.J.R. 53 and the Second Amendment. The change
reflected Representative Prosser's belief that the word "people" was "broader
in meaning" than the word "individual.""5 The change was necessary, he
stated, to protect the right of every law-abiding individual, as well as all
"organizations, clubs or other groups" to bear arms."' Thus, rather than
securing the collective rights of undifferentiated masses to join an efficient
militia, Wisconsin extends to each individual citizen the right to carry
weapons for security, defense, hunting, recreation, or any other lawful
purpose. Indeed, the amendment's primary sponsor, Assembly Speaker Scott
Jensen (R-Brookfield) adamantly stated that this individual right would be
reason."57
restricted only if the state could "prove a compelling public safety
Thus, in contrast to the right protected under the Second Amendment,
legislators were making clear that they were creating afundamentalindividual
right to keep and bear arms.58 Militia membership would be irrelevant, and
any restrictions of that right would have to pass heightened review, if not strict
scrutiny, in order to remain valid.
A second signal that the Legislature hoped to limit governmental
encroachment was its deletion of the phrase excepting a person "restricted in
accordance with federal law" from protection under the Wisconsin state
constitution. 9 The Legislature made this change in response to a LRB
drafter's note warning that such language could be interpreted to mean A.J.R.
53 automatically "invalidate[s] any state law that differs from federal laws"
rather than creating a separate, independent basis for the evaluation of state
gun control laws.'

55. 'Supermax' Prison ProposalDownsized, CAPrrALTIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at 5A,
available in 1996 WL 8894928 ("[tlhe new wording is broader in its meaning and appears to
pass legal and constitutional muster.")
56. By protecting the rights of organizations, groups, and clubs to bear arms,
Representative Prosser intended to insure that members of businesses, corporations, and labor
unions could use weapons or hire armed security guards to protect the entity's property or in
self-defense of its. individual members. See id.; JEFREN E. OLSEN & PETER J. DYKMAN,
DRAFTER'S NOTE FROM THE LEGISLATURE REFERENCE BUREAU 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995
DRAFTER'S NOTE]. Cf.United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942) (Second
Amendment "was not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for the States
in the maintenance of their militia organizations").
57. Mayers, supra note 17 (emphasis supplied); see also HAAS, supra note 4, at 6
(discussing standard of review).
58. See SALM & HAAS, supra note 8, at 3-4 (describing application of heightened
review).
59. Assembly Amendment 1, 1st Sess. (Oct. 19, 1995) to A.J.R. 53, 1st Sess. (Wis.
1995), noted in 2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1995-96 SEssION) 595 (Oct. 19, 1995).
60. 1995 DRAFTER'S NOTE, supra note 56, at 1.
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Such a result would have conflicted with Speaker Jensen's vision of the
amendment for two reasons. First, as an LC analysis observed, Congress
traditionally has enjoyed wide power to enact gun control regulations pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.6 ' Dozens of restrictions have been enacted under
such powers, and none of them have run afoul of the Second Amendment. 2
Second and more importantly, because the Second Amendment guarantees
only a collective right, some courts have refused to even hear Second
Amendment objections to state-enacted gun control regulations. For example,
in Hickman v. Block,63 the Ninth Circuit refused to reach the merits of a
California resident's claim that the state's gun licensing system violated his
Second Amendment rights. Reasoning that the Second Amendment "is meant
solely to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain armed militia," the
court held that "the states alone stand in the position to show legal injury
when this right is infringed" and that the plaintiff, in his capacity as an
individual citizen, lacked Article Ill standing to challenge the restriction."
The effect of such an interpretation was essentially to deny the plaintiff access
to court to present a good faith challenge to the "collective rights" interpretation and, if victorious, to argue the deprivation of his rights.
If the Wisconsin Bear Arms amendment were interpreted simply to
incorporate federal precedent and the reasoning of Hickman against the state
of Wisconsin, it might prevent Wisconsin citizens from challenging state laws
on state constitutional grounds, thus threatening to undermine the amendment's entire purpose of limiting both federal and state intrusions. After all,
if the legal right to bear arms is a "state right" possessed exclusively by the
state of Wisconsin, and it guarantees only a collective right of the general
public to bear arms in response to a state's request for assistance with its
militia, then a citizen would not suffer any legally cognizable injury if she
individually were forbidden to possess or own weapons for purely personal
purposes. As long as the state felt it could adequately maintain its militia
despite the regulation, then a disarmed individual would be permissibly
"restricted in accordance with federal law"'6 as interpreted by Hickman.

61. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(invalidating prohibition against possessing firearm within school zone, when gun has not
moved in interstate commerce, as violating Commerce Clause).
62. See HAAS,supra note 4, at 12. Cf.Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(invalidating requirement that state law enforcement officers perform federal background checks
of gun purchasers, as violating 10th Amendment); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (invalidating federal
restriction on carrying weapons within school zones, as violating Commerce Clause).
63. 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. Seeid.atlO-03.
65. A.J.R. 53, 1st Sess. (Wis. 1995), supra note 40.
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Along with Congress's broad powers to enact regulations under the Commerce
Clause, this interpretation would transform the Bear Arms amendment from
an independent source of individual liberty to a mere footnote to federal law.
By removing this provision, the Legislature again eliminated another possible
textual source to which supporters of gun control regulation could point,"
strengthened the independent state constitutional right to keep and bear arms,
and insured that an individual would have a legally cognizable injury if that
right were restricted.
Of course, while Congress enjoys wide power to regulate the right to
keep and bear arms, it nevertheless may not deprive all law-abiding citizens
from exercising such liberty. Congress may, for example, prevent convicted
felons from owning handguns.67 Likewise, it can prevent all citizens from
owning sawed-off shotguns that have no "reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"6 or from owning
weapons of modem warfare, such as tanks, bazookas, grenades, or assault
weapons. 69 However, Congress may not prevent law-abiding citizens from
owning common weapons of self-defense, such as shotguns or rifles.
Therefore, states with bear arms amendments prohibiting and permitting
exactly the same gun regulations authorized under the Second Amendment
offer their citizens more protection against state-based intrusion than states
with no such provisions at all.
However, rather than simply incorporate the Second Amendment against
the state of Wisconsin, the Legislature re-drafted the Bear Arms amendment
to impose additional, independent limitations upon the ability of Wisconsin
state officials to enact gun regulations. Although, as noted earlier, A.J.R. 53
originally maintained that citizens have the right to bear arms "for any lawful
purpose including for security or defense, for hunting and for recreational
66. Cf. 1990 DRAFrER'S NOTE, supra note 47, at 1 (arguing that original draft "would
wipe out [the state's guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms] within the limits allowed by
federal law as the supreme law of the land").
67. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
68. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
69. See United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 340-41 n.4 (Second Amendment, at
minimum, protects "ownership of guns of the type suitable for use in the militia in the
eighteenth century"); Dowlut, supra note 39, at 78-81; see also Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond
the Second Amendment: An IndividualRight to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (Ninth Amendment protects individual's right to possess weapons
for self defense). Cf. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982)
(dicta) ("the right to keep and bear handguns is not protected by the Second Amendment");
Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretationsof United
States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 961, 961-65 (1995-96)
(challenging the American Bar Association's support of a national gun ban).
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use," 71 the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice and Corrections amended
the text to read that citizens may keep and bear arms "for security, defense,
hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose.'7

A.J.R. 53's original

language placed one's right to bear arms within a milieu of lawful purposes
that the Legislature is free to define, thus arguably protecting the right only to
the extent that positive law fails to prohibit it. 73 If, for example, the Legislature declared that the bearing of concealed weapons was not lawfully related
to security, defense, hunting, or recreational use, then the Bear Arms
amendment conceivably would no longer offer protection. However, in
comparison, the enacted text is much broader; it might aptly be seen as a floor
rather than a ceiling. It seems to guarantee in all circumstances a citizen's
right to bear arms for security, defense, hunting, or recreation, and it permits
the Legislature only to define additional lawful purposes that may deserve
further protection-not to restrict them.' 4
By making these textual changes that expanded the right to bear arms,
and by rejecting changes that would have constrained that right, the Legislature made clear that the Bear Arms amendment is to be broadly construed.
The Legislature was informed, for example, that protecting one's right to bear
arms for "security" as well as "defense" might be read to prohibit state assault
weapons bans or restrictions on the possession of non-military weapons, 5 yet
it made no effort to guard against such a statutory interpretation. It similarly
declined an invitation by the LRB to limit one's right to "defend" herself
solely to situations that promote the "common defense," defense of the "civil
power," or of "lawful authority."' 6 Moreover, on two occasions, the
Legislature rejected proposed amendments by Representative Bock that would
have made the resolution a verbatim incorporation of the Second
Amendment," which offers little protection against gun restrictions. 7' Finally,

71. A.J.R. 53, 1st. Sess. (Wis. 1995), supra note 40 (emphasis supplied).
72. Assembly Substitute Amendment I to A.J.R. 53, 2d Sess. (Wis. 1996), supra note
48 (emphasis supplied).
73. A.J.R. 53, 1st Sess. (Wis. 1995), supra note 40.
74. WIs. CoNST. Art. I, §25.
75. See 1995 DRAFrER'S NOTE, supra note 56, at 2.
76. Id. (suggesting that amendment's language is quite expansive and should be
clarified).
77. See Assembly Substitute Amendment 2, 2d Sess. (Mar. 26, 1996) to A.J.R. 53, 1st
Sess. (Wis. 1995), noted in 2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL(1995-96 SEssioN) 1031 (Mar. 26, 1996) ("A
well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"); Assembly Substitute Amendment 3, 1st Sess. (Jan.
28, 1997) to A.J.R. 11, 1st Sess. (Wis. 1997), noted in 2 ASSEMBLY JOURNAL (1997-98 SESSION)

37 (Jan. 28, 1998) (same).
78. See supra notes 50-51, 61-64, 67-70 and accompanying text.
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it turned down a proposed amendment by Senator Fred Risser (D-Madison)
that would have made the right to bear arms expressly subordinate to the
state's exercise of lawful police power. 9 Senator Risser's proposal would
have made Wisconsin's constitutional provision nearly identical to the Illinois
constitutional provision, s° which has been held to allow such legislative
infringements as complete citywide bans on handguns" t-the very type of
82
legislative activity that led to the amendment's framing in the first instance.
All of this legislative history indicates that the Bear Arms amendment
is supposed to yield to only minimal, reasonable regulations that are
absolutely necessary under the state's police powers. Regardless of how other
states had interpreted their protection of the right to keep and bear arms, 3 the
Wisconsin Legislature seems to have envisioned a wide-ranging guarantee.
Indeed, by speaking the language of fundamental rights and heightened
scrutiny, 4 rather than mere rational basis review, Speaker Jensen and other
supporters singled out the right to keep and bear arms as one of peculiar
importance, yet unusually vulnerable to state infringement, and, therefore, in
need of the strongest possible protection.
2. Statements and Drafting Records Directly Implicating State Regulation
of CarryingConcealed Weapons
The Legislature's decisions most relevant to a constitutional analysis of
Section 941.23 are those that eliminated the phrase providing that "the manner
of bearing arms may be regulated as authorized by the legislature by law."8"
As noted earlier, the original draft of A.J.R. 53 provided that:
Every individual, except an individual restricted in accordance with state or federal law, has the right to keep and
bear arms for any lawful purpose including for security or
defense, for hunting and for recreational use, except that the

79. See Senate Amendment 2, 2d Sess. (Mar. 12, 1998) to A.J.R. 11, Ist Sess. (Wis.

1997), noted in 1SENATE JouRNAL(1997-98

SESSION) 513

(Mar. 12, 1998) ("but such right to

bear arms does not preclude restricting the use of arms in the exercise of lawful police powers.")
80. Compareid. with ILL. CONST. Art. I, § 22 ("Subject only to the police power, the
right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed").
81. See Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984).
82. See supra Part I.A.
83. See generally Kopel, Cramer & Hattrup, supra note 7,at 1204-29 (discussing state
court interpretations of the right to keep and bear arms).
84. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; infra notes 120-21 and
accompanying text.
85. A.J.R. 53, 1st Sess. (Wis. 1995), supra note 40.
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manner of bearing
arms may be regulatedin accordance
86
with state law.
However, the Bear Arms amendment, as enacted, does not facially limit
the purposes for which arms may be borne. 7 It contains no express reservation of the right to regulate the manner of bearing arms. The Legislature
removed this provision and rejected subsequent amendments that would have
restored it."8 Along with statements made by legislators and other statewide
public officials, these decisions signaled that legislators did not feel Section
941.23 was consistent with the Bear Arms amendment's scope and purpose.
a.

Legislative History and Drafting Records

If the Legislature had retained the above-quoted language allowing for
regulation of the manner of bearing arms, it would be clear that the Bear Arms
amendment would not prevent the continued enforcement of Section 941.23.
Indeed, the LRB's 1995 drafting note implied that the original language was
intended to shield Section 941.23 from retroactive judicial invalidation. 9 An
LC report also informed the Legislature that, under its inherent police power
authority, it would be able to enact various gun regulations, such as limiting
the state's hunting season or mandating the safe storage of a loaded firearm
around children. 90 The report cited five types of regulations upheld in other
state court cases. These cases included Arnold v. Cleveland,9 which forbade
the possession of assault weapons; People v. Brown,92 which forbade the
possession of certain other dangerous weapons that are not commonly
possessed by law-abiding citizens; State v. Ricehill,93 which forbade felons
from possessing firearms; State v. Comeau," which forbade the possession of
firearms with altered serial numbers and the possession of sawed-off shotguns
by felons; and People v. Blue,95 which forbade the carrying of weapons by

86.

Id.

87. See SA.M & HAAS, supra note 8, at 6.
88. See infra notes 97-107.
89. See 1995 DRAFTER'S NoTE, supra note 56, at 2-3; see also State v. Knies, 371
N.W.2d 430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that Section 941.23 does not violate the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms). However, Knies has no precedential value, for it is
an unpublished opinion. See Wis. R. Civ. P. 809.23(3).
90. See HAAS, supra note 4, at 10-11.
91. 616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
92. 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1931).
93. 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).
94. 448 N.W.2d 595 (Neb. 1989).
95. 544 P.2d 385 (Col. 1975).
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an unfitness to be
felons who "by their past conduct, have demonstrated
' 96
instrumentalities.
dangerous
with...
entrusted
Not a single one of these cases dealt with a state's ability to regulate the
carrying of concealed weapons by law-abiding citizens-much less a state's
ability to absolutely forbid the practice, as Section 941.23 authorizes. However, the LRB drafters did report that such a prohibition "is generally held to
be reasonable," though they provided no case law to support their assertion.97
With such knowledge of the likely interpretation of the Bear Arms amendment, the LRB drafters asked, would the present draft comport with the Legislature's intent "concerning the state's regulation of the bearing of arms"?"
In other words, should the amendment be intended to be read as forbidding the
freedom to carry concealed weapons? Or were changes necessary?
The Legislature called for changes. First, in October 1995, the Assembly
Committee on Elections and Constitutional Law removed all language
granting the government explicit authority to regulate the bearing of arms. 99
Then, seven months later, the Senate rejected a subsequent amendment to
reinstate such language." ° Finally, the Assembly rejected an identical
proposal during second consideration of the Bear Arms resolution in late
January 1997. I01 In short, on three occasions, the Legislature declined to
create a state right to bear arms that also singled out for disapproval the
carrying of concealed weapons.
Legislators who received a special LC analysis of the newly drafted
resolution ("the Salm & Haas memo") knew full well that their actions might
render Section 941.23's absolute pr6hibition against carrying concealed
weapons incompatible with the Bear Arms amendment. The memo, which
was circulated among members of the Senate Committee on Judiciary,
Campaign Finance Reform, and Consumer Affairs one month before it sent
A.J.R. 53 to the full senate for second consideration, ominously observed that

96.

Id. at 391.

97. 1995 DRAFrER'S NOTE, supra note 56,at 3. Current legislative practice belies the
drafters' insinuation that such prohibitions are commonplace. Only seven states prohibit the
carrying of concealed weapons, while 31 states allow virtually every law-abiding citizen to carry
them. The remaining dozen authorize carrying if the citizen can articulate a legitimate need for

doing so. See Todd Barnet, Gun "Control" Laws Violate the Second Amendment and May
Lead to Higher Crime Rates, 63 Mo. L. REV. 155, 179-82 (1998).

1995 DRAFrER'S NOTE, supra note 56, at 3.
See Assembly Substitute Amendment 2, 2d Sess. (Mar. 26, 1996) to A.J.R. 53, 1st
1995), supra note 77.
See Senate Amendment 1, 2d Sess. (May 8, 1996) to A.J.R. 53, 1st Sess. (Wis.
1995), noted in ISENATE JOuRNAL(1995-96 SESSION) 802 (May 8, 1996).
101. See Assembly Substitute Amendment 2, 1st Sess. (Jan. 28, 1997) to A.J.R. 11, 1st
Sess. (Wis. 1997) noted in 2 ASEMBLYJOURNAL(1997-98 SESSION) 37 (Jan. 28, 1997).
98.
99.
Sess. (Wis.
100.
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"[m]any states do not absolutely prohibit the carrying of a concealed weapon,
but require a person wishing to carry a concealed wepon to obtain a permit."'"
"No matter what standard [of review] is applied," it stated, "certain criminal
laws are, perhaps, not as narrowly tailored as they might be in light of a constitutional right to keep and bear arms."'0 3 The memo suggested that "a permit
system, rather than an absolute prohibition, [could] be a more acceptable
response, in constitutional terms, to the problem being addressed since it is
tailored more narrowly with respect to the right to keep and bear arms."'" If
the Legislature wanted to continue the state's longstanding practice against
carrying concealed weapons, the memo suggested, Section 941.23:
could be (and probably should be) rewritten and clarified at
some point, either: (1) prior to the effective date of the
'right to keep and bear arms' to make it unlikely that a
challenge based on constitutional grounds would succeed;
or (2) after adoption of the right, in response to a court
decision holding, perhaps, that the statute needs to be more
narrowly tailored to accomplish its goal." 5
Despite being warned about its implications on the state's ban on
carrying concealed weapons, the Senate committee made no changes to the
drafted amendment. Nor did it propose any changes to Section 941.23 that
might have rendered it less susceptible to constitutional challenge. Instead,
the committee unanimously recommended that the amendment be approved,'
and the Senate followed suit, after first rejecting Senator Risser's proposal to
condition the right to bear arms on the state's lawful exercise of its police
power. 7 This legislative history can hardly support the inference that the
Legislature sought to exempt Section 941.23 from searching judicial review.
b.

Statements Transmitted to Voters

Moreover, as constitutional amendments repeal previously enacted
statutes that are inconsistent with the amendment's scope and purpose,'
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

& HAAS, supra note 8, at 10.
Id. at 10-12. Among these laws, the report stated, was Section 941.23. See id.
Id. at 10.
Id.at 9.
SALM

See GARY WATCHKE, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE WISCONSIN VOTERS, NOVEMBER 3,

1998 (Sept. 1998).
107. See Senate Amendment 2, 2d Sess. (Mar. 12, 1998) to A.J.R. 11, 1st Sess. (Wis.
1997).
108. See Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 150 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. 1967). For an example
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Section 941.23 should fail judicial review, for myriad statements regularly
conveyed to Wisconsin voters indicate that voters understood that Section
941.23 could not be squared with the Bear Arms amendment.
As early as January 1996, Attorney General Doyle, the state's chief law
enforcement officer, was warning voters that the amendment would subject
to challenge "every law in Wisconsin that has anything to do with arms.'"'°
Similarly, a subsequent Journal & Sentinel editorial published two days
before the election stated that "the amendment may even roll back the scant
controls already on the books, such as prohibitions... against the carrying of
concealed weapons."'1 0 Several editorials appearing in the Capital Times
concurred. The amendment, "of course, could open all sorts of other
mischief"'" the Capital Times stated, such as allowing citizens to carry
weapons "concealed under a coat... [or] [w]om in a holster on the street. '1 2
Likewise, it was with the proposed Bear Arms amendment in mind that
Governor Thompson opined that the state might no longer outlaw per se the
carrying of dangerous weapons under Section 941.23, but only forbid citizens
from carrying weapons in a menacing manner-a practice that is barred under
Wisconsin's disorderly conduct statute." 3 Finally, after emerging from a
hearing in which the Senate defeated his proposal to make the right to bear
arms subordinate to the police power, Senator Risser indicated that legislators
were allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons.' 1 4 "Does society really
want to let persons carry concealed weapons?" he asked in a subsequent
Capital Times editorial. "This is scary!""' 5
Speaker Jensen and other sponsors of the amendment failed to deny that
the Bear Arms amendment and Section 941.23 were at war with each other.

of another state's invalidation of prior legislation inconsistent with its constitutional right to
bear arms, see State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139 (W. Va. 1988)
(striking down prohibition against carrying all dangerous or deadly weapons without a license).
Jan. 22, 1996, at IA,
109. Sharon Theimer, Gun Legislation Considered, WIS. ST. J.,
available in 1996 WL 7069348. Gordon Baldwin, a University of Wisconsin law professor,
agreed with Doyle's analysis. See id.
110. Editorial, To Preserve Reasonable Gun Curbs, Vote 'No', MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 14048858.
111. Editorial, Keep Sense on Gun Limits, CAPITAL TnMEs, Jan. 2, 1998, at 10A,
available in 1998 WL 5856774.
112. Editorial, Gun Lobby on the March, CAPITAL TIMES, Jan. 22,1996, at 2C, available
in 1996 WL 7069345.
113. See Theimer, supra note 109 at IA. The disorderly conduct statute can be found
at WIS. STAT. § 947.01 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
114. Matt Ponmer, Senate Clears Wayfor Gun Amendment Vote, CAPITAL TIMES, Mar.
13, 1998, at 2A, availablein 1998 WL 5864515.
115. Fred Risser, Editorial, Shoot Down Gun Amendment, CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 31,
1998, at 14A, availablein 1998 WL 14536533.
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Although Jensen argued that the Bear Arms amendment would not affect any
local gun control ordinances," 6 Section 941.23 is a statewide statute. Just
because the Bear Arms amendment would not affect local laws does not mean
it would have no impact on Section 941.23. In fact, the Wisconsin State
Journal made this exact observation, citing the Salm & Haas memo's
statement that "laws that may be challenged in court include those dealing
with storing firearms out of reach of children, carrying concealed weapons,
discharging a firearm while on another person's land, and possession of
' 7 All of these regulations,
electric stun guns1.
of course, are statewide.
The amendment's sponsors gave no serious indication that they intended
to immunize Section 941.23 from constitutional challenge. Instead, the Bear
Arms amendment's chief Senate sponsor, Senator David Zien (R-Eau Claire),
expressed quite narrow views as to which laws he felt were intended to remain
in effect, stating only that the amendment "will not open the door for felons"
to own weapons."' Meanwhile, when speaking to the general public, Speaker
Jensen typically stressed that the amendment would "require a higher burden
of proof for gun-control measures."" 9 At campaign stops in several cities,
Jensen and then-Senate President Brian Rude (R-Coon Valley)-an amendment co-sponsor-added that it would "require the state to prove a compelling
public safety reason before curtailing the gun rights of law-abiding
citizens." 20 However, as the Salm & Haas memo indicated, statutes like
Section 941.23 arguably would not be able to satisfy this heightened
scrutiny,' 2 ' especially since no legislators suggested that the state's concealed

116. See, e.g., Editorial, Gun Amendment Deserves Support, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998,
at 5A,available in 1998 WL 14535801 ("the amendment would not repeal existing local gun

laws, nor allow gun sales to felons"); Mike Flaherty, Assembly Supports Right to Bear Arms,

WIS. ST. J., Mar. 27, 1996, at 3B, available in 1996 WL 8895275 (arguing that constitutional
amendments generally allow local gun restrictions).
117. Legal Issues of Gun Measure Addressed, WIS. ST. J., June 14, 1998, at 4B,
available in 1998 WL 5874360 (emphasis supplied). More than a cursory examination of the
Bear Arms amendment's effect on these other regulations, however, is beyond the scope of this
Essay. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
118. Richard P. Jones, Senate Approves Amendment to Bear Arms, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, Mar. 13, 1998, at 1, availablein 1998 WL 6306992.
119. Editorial, Put Gun Amendment to General Vote, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 19, 1998, at 13A,
available in 1998 WL 5865132 (adding that amendment would not allow felons to own

firearms).

120. Mayers, supra note 17; see also HAAS, supra note 4, at 6 (amendment would create
fundamental right to keep and bear arms). Jensen and Rude visited Eau Claire, Green Bay, La
Crosse, and Waukesha. See Mayers, supra note 17.
121. See SALM & HAAS, supra note 8, at 10 (suggesting that permit system might be
viable alternative to absolute prohibition of carrying concealed weapons).
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weapon ban would remain intact, therefore failing to establish a legislative
intent for such a proposition.
Taken as a whole, the statements of Jensen, Zien, and others solely
assured citizens that the Bear Arms amendment would not affect two types of
statewide restrictions: (1) the state's 48-hour waiting period to obtain
firearms; and (2) its prohibition against gun ownership and possession by
convicted felons."n These statements can be seen as mere acknowledgements
2
of the supremacy of federal law and their obligation to support such law.' 1
Federal law trumps state law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause," 4 and federal
law already establishes a waiting period and assault weapons ban and restricts
felons from carrying weapons.' Whether to restrict the freedom to carry
concealed weapons, however, is within a state's discretion, and a state-enacted
restriction at odds with a state constitutional provision cannot stand.
Therefore, by negative implication, Jensen and Zien's statements that the Bear
Arms amendment would have no effect on federal law utterly fail to imply that
it would not impact existing state laws, such as Section 941.23. As Madison
Mayor Paul Soglin reminded voters eight days before the election, "[tihe
proponents of this plan can't give us the guarantees that they won't use this
amendment to try and undo [existing] legislation to protect us in the area of
safety."'' 6 It is with this understanding that Wisconsin voters approved the
Bear Arms amendment, and it became effective immediately.
There is one final remaining objection to such an interpretation,
however. Embedded in the nineteenth-century Wisconsin Supreme Court case
of Wisconsin CentralR.R. Co. v. Taylor County1 7 is the precedent that the
Wisconsin judiciary should interpret its state constitution in harmony with
judgments made by other courts with similar provisions. The only state court
to have considered whether its constitution categorically forbids regulation of

122. See Theimer, supra note 109 (Jensen argues that "a federal waiting period is clearly
constitutional, as is barring felons from owning guns"); Gun Rights Amendment: What Would
It Do?, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 13, 1998, at 3A, available in 1998 WL 5864467 (legislators supporting
the amendment said it would allow regulations forbidding convicts from owning guns); see also
Jones, supra note 118 (Zien states that amendment will not allow felons to possess guns);
WATCHKE, supra note 106, at 4 (amendment's proponents say it "[will] not hinder reasonable
gun controls, including bans on machine guns and assault rifles or prohibitions against
ownership or possession of guns by convicted felons").
123. This obligation derives from the Oath or Affirmation Clause. See U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 3.
124. See id. art. VI, cl. 2.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1996).
126. Jennifer Batog, Gun Amendment Seen As Gateway, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at
3B, availablein 1998 WL 14535824.
127. 8 N.W. 833, 839 (Wis.1881) (interpreting Wisconsin constitution).
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an individual's right to carry concealed weapons was a Delaware appellate
court in In re Application of Wolstenhome.'2 8 The court, in an unpublished
opinion, found that the right established in the Delaware constitution, which
states that "[a] person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of
29
self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use,, was not
fundamental. Accordingly, the court applied rational basis review-but
undertook no analysis of legislative intent and history-and upheld the state's
regulation requiring citizens to "express a valid work-related need" in order
to obtain a concealed carry permit. 3 0 One might argue that the Wisconsin
Bear Arms amendment should be similarly construed, so as to allow complete
prohibition of carrying concealed weapons.
However, there is no obvious reason why Wisconsin courts should
follow Delaware's lead. First, notwithstanding the precedent of Wisconsin
Central, Wisconsin courts do not blindly defer to the interpretations and
judgments of sister states."' According to former Wisconsin Supreme Court
Justice N.S. Heffernan, "all of the specific provisions of the Declaration of
Rights are to be construed in light of the preamble's pronouncement that the
primary purpose of the Wisconsin constitution is not to create a government,
but to secure and preserve pre-existing liberties.' 32 The Wisconsin judiciary
only grudgingly subordinates individual rights to the state's assertion of police
power.'33 Thus, almost 100 years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
in State v. Kruetzberg that "[ilt would be inconceivable that the people of
Wisconsin... should by general grant of legislative power have intended to
confer upon that government authority to wholly subvert those primary rights"
34
enunciated in the Declaration of Rights.

128. No. 92M-04-006, 1992 WL 207245 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992).
129. DEL CONST. Art. I, § 20. Note the similarity to the Wisconsin Bear Arms
amendment. Compare id. with WIs. CONST. art. I,§ 25.
130. In reApplication of Wolstenhome, 1992 WL 207245. at *4-6.
131. This practice has been described as "a sort of pallid me-tooism." For general
criticism of the practice, see John P. Frank, The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1339, 1340-43 (1985) (book review).
132. Junaid H. Chida, Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution:
Presentationof ConstitutionalQuestions in State Courts, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 483, 486 n.8.
133. The Wisconsin judiciary has repeatedly remarked that the state constitution's
primary purpose is to preserve individual freedom. See id. "The Wisconsin constitution
emphasizes the protection of liberty, valuing freedom more than an ordered system of

government." Id. at 485.
134. 90 N.W. 1098, 1099 (Wis. 1902). This view has been expressed by other jurists.
In a speech he delivered in Milwaukee, former Justice William 0. Douglas responded to an
introduction that praised the United States Supreme Court for its protection of human liberties
by stating, "We are just trying to catch up with the Wisconsin Supreme Court. We are almost
at the point where it was 30 years ago." Chida, supranote 132, at 487.
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Furthermore, Wisconsin courts recognize a duty to construe constitutional provisions "to avoid unreasonable and absurd results."' 3 5 Irrespective

of the Delaware court's interpretation of its state constitution, a Wisconsin

citizen's right to keep and bear arms is located in the constitution's primary
Declaration of Rights, and legislative history indicates that it is
fundamental.' 36 A court reaches an unreasonable result when it upholds
severe burdens upon one's fundamental rights. Section 941.23's complete
prohibition against carrying any type of concealed weapon goes much further
than the license permit scheme sought to be invalidated in In re Application
of Wolstenhome.' 3 In fact, it imposes much harsher restrictions than those
authorized in Nebraska, Nevada, or North Dakota--the three states- identified
by the widely-circulated 1995 LC memo as having Bear Arms constitutional
provisions similar to Wisconsin's. 3

A cursory analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence underscores

Section 941.23's unreasonableness. When considering the constitutionality

of restrictions of speech, courts begin with the premise that an individual has
the right to say what she pleases, in the manner of her choosing. 39 Then, they
carefully balance the societal and individual interests at stake, and they sustain
restrictions only in rare circumstances when the state expresses a compelling
need to do so." 4 Therefore, one may, among other things, advocate violence

135. State v. Newman, 459 N.W.2d 882,885 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
136. See supra notes 16-17, 57-58, 119-20 and accompanying text.
137. See In re Application of Wolstenhome, No. 92M-04-006, 1992 WL 207245 (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992).
138. See HAAS, supra note 4, at 3, 10. Nevada law requires local law enforcement
officials to issue concealed-carry permits to adults who have completed a certified firearm safety
training course. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.350 (1997 and Supp. 1999). The law makes
exceptions for habitual drunks, insane persons, or people convicted of felonies and domesticrelated crimes. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.3653 (1997 and Supp. 1999). Citizens in North
Dakota may obtain a concealed-carry permit if they articulate a "valid reason" related to work
or defense needs. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-04-03 (1998 and Supp. 1999). Finally, while
Nebraska generally does not allow citizens to carry concealed weapons, state law allows citizens
engaged in any lawful business, calling, or employment to carry a concealed weapon if "the
circumstances in which [the citizen] was placed at the time were such as to justify a prudent
person" in carrying the weapon "for the defense of his person, property or family." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-1202 (1998). Wisconsin, however, makes no exception whatsoever. See WIS. STAT.
§ 941.23 (1997).
139. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTiONAL LAW § 12-2, at 790 (2d ed.
1988) ("Any adverse government action aimed at communicative impact is presumptively at
odds with the First Amendment").
140. See id. at 791-93. "Any exclusion of a class of activities from First Amendment
safeguards reflects an implicit conclusion that the governmental interests in regulating those
activities are such as to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed upon free expression of
ideas." Id. at 792.
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unless the speech is likely to cause imminent lawlessness,' 41 or operate adult
movie theaters except in designated areas. 42 Free speech is the general rule,
and regulation is the jealously guarded exception.
The Wisconsin Legislature, of course, can restrict the right to bear arms
to achieve a compelling safety purpose. 143 However, Section 941.23 does not
allow for balancing between fundamental individual rights and public safety.
Although Wisconsin citizens have the right to bear arms for security or
defense* Section 941.23 decrees that they can never carry any type of
concealed weapon, anywhere, at any time, or for any reason. Thus, read in
light of the Bear Arms amendment, Section 941.23 presumes that public safety
concerns always outweigh an individual's right to carry concealed weapons.
Undoubtedly, the potential for misuse of concealed weapons could
sometimes outweigh the interest in self-protection. The mixture of hot
tempers and alcohol might justify restricting weapons around taverns, for
example, just as the chance that weapons may fall into the hands of children
could justify gun-free school zones. 44 But this is not always the case. If a
law-abiding restaurant owner in a high-crime urban area closes shop after
midnight, then walks two blocks to her car, why is her right to self-protection
irrebuttably presumed insufficient to justify choosing the best means and
manner for doing so? What about the divorced woman who fears an ambush
attack by her ex-husband? The newspaper editor rooting out corruption? The
common citizen who walks through the park instead of detouring around it?
Just as the state's interest in preventing violence or upholding morals rarely
outweighs an individual's right to advocate revolution or display pornography,
the state's interest in maintaining public safety should rarely justify preventing
someone from carrying concealed weapons to protect herself.
Section 941.23's prohibitions can follow only from a general determination that law-abiding citizens can never responsibly exercise their freedom to
carry concealed weapons of any type. It is true that they sometimes cannot,
and the right to bear arms (whether it is guns, knives, or other weapons) is
then subject to reasonable public safety regulations. 45 However, in all other
instances, as we do in the First Amendment context, we should respect a
citizen's free exercise of her right to bear arms even though we may disagree
with her choice to do so. At a minimum, judicial deference must be
141. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
142. Cf. Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-17 (1975) (state may
regulate display of nudity on movie theater screens visible from public places but not on basis
of movie's content).
143. See supra note 16-17 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
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supplanted by searching scrutiny, lest the protection afforded disappear.
Courts should require the state to justify its legislation with detailed,
persuasive, compelling evidentiary findings, rigorously question the state's
alleged interest, and reluctantly sustain only those few restrictions that are
narrowly tailored to promote the compelling state interest.
Section 941.23 does none of this. Read in conjunction with the Bear
Arms amendment, Section 941.23 stifles constitutionally protected activity
without any showing of serious impending social harm. No court that takes
rights seriously can argue otherwise. Thus, Section 941.23 in its present form
should fall. To uphold such an oppressive, absolute restriction would
disregard the will of the Legislature and the voters, undermine the purpose for
which the Bear Arms amendment was enacted, and render it meaningless.
II.

OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, REASONABLE GUN REGULATIONS AND

PUBLIC SAFETY

Last November, Wisconsin voters enshrined one of the oldest rights in
the Anglo-American heritage.146 The right to keep and bear arms is linked to
national security under the federal constitution's Militia Clauses,147 and it is
considered essential to checking government tyranny and the power of a
standing army. 14 1 It facilitates self-defense, and it is also closely associated
with the tradition of recreational hunting passed on throughout generations of
Wisconsin families. 49 Wisconsin voters no doubt had some, if not all, of
these purposes in mind when they resolved to protect their right to bear arms
against unreasonable state-based regulations.' 5°

146. Locke, Montesquieu and Harrington all supported the right to bear arms as
necessary for the preservation of a free people, and it was one of the "Rights of Englishmen"
protected against government intrusion by the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See James Biser
Whisker, The Citizen-Soldier UnderFederal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 952-53
(1992); see generally MALCOLM, supra note 3 (discussing historical origins of right to bear arms
in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
147.

See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.

For an analysis of the historical

interrelationship of the militia, the National Guard, and the right to bear arms, see Whisker,
supra note 146.
148. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637,
643-52 (1989); Glenn Harland Reynolds, A CriticalGuide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN.
L. REV. 461,465-82 (1995).
149. See Mike Flaherty, State Closer to Gun-Rights Guarantee,Jan. 29, 1997, at IA
availablein 1997 WL 7050664 (discussing support for amendment among hunters and sports
enthusiasts).
150. It is worth mentioning that police are under no duty to protect every law-abiding
citizen at all times. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
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But will allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons promote these
purposes without threatening public safety? Reliable empirical data suggests
so. A majority of Americans live in the thirty-one states that allow nearly

limitless carrying of concealed weapons."' While a full discussion of social
science research is beyond the scope of this article, recent studies by
Professors John R. Lott, Jr., and David B. Mustard demonstrate that states

with permissive concealed weapons laws see fewer crimes of murder, rape,
aggravated assault, and robbery.' 52 A jurisdiction that enacts such laws might

see an increase in property crimes, where the probability of contact between
the criminal and victim is minimal,' but victims who resist with a gun will
be less likely to lose their property or suffer personal injuries." Additionally,
the jurisdiction will see an almost non-existent rate of intentional misuse of
concealed weapons and almost no increase in deaths caused by accidental
misuse.' 55
Easier access to guns does not mean more crime. Quite to the contrary,
commentators argue that such access offers "women, the elderly, the weak, the
infirm, and the physically handicapped" who cannot defend themselves
adequately against stronger aggressors "the most effective self-defense tools"
available.' 56 If these commentators are correct, then it follows that a secure
151. See Barnet, supra note 97, at 179-82.
152. See John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997) (presenting 15-year study on relationship
between concealed-carry laws and criminal deterrence); see also GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK:
GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 134-35 (1991) (carrying of concealed weapons deters
robbery). Voluminous literature examines the relationship among handguns, crime and public
safety. For a sampling, see Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Causes and Correlates of
Lethal Violence in America: American Homicide Exceptionalism, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 698
(1998); DON B. KATES, JR., & GARY KLECK, THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE 149-223
(1997); Guns and Violence Symposium, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1995); Edgar A.
Suter, Guns in the Medical Literature-A Failure of Peer Review, 83 J. MED. ASS'N GA. 133
(1994); Nicholas Dixon, Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States, 12 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 243 (1993); David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection? The Risks and Benefits of
Handgun Prohibition, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 285 (1993).
153. See Lott & Mustard, supra note 152, at 24.
154. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and
Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 151-52, 177-82 (1995).
155. See Lott & Mustard, supra note 152, at 62-65. Multnomah County, Or., for
instance, issued 11,140 concealed-carry permits between 1990 and 1994. Only one firearm was
used unjustifiably, fired in a domestic dispute. See id. at 3 n.9. Similarly in Florida, although
more than 220,000 citizens possess concealed carry licenses, only 18 crimes involving a firearm
were committed by licensed gun owners within a seven-year period. Additionally, 362 were
subsequently revoked by state law enforcement officials. See Clayton E. Cramer & David B.
Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave Of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV.
679, 690-92 (1995).
156. Inge Anna Larish, Why Annie Can't Get Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the
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and empowered population will be better able to enjoy all its other rights, such
as freedom to travel, freedom of association, and-above all-freedom from
fear. Thus, one could plausibly argue that limiting the right to carry concealed
weapons is neither constitutional nor wise.
Yet, there are two sides to this argument. Various reports published in
the Journal of the American Medical Association and the New England
Journal of Medicine, for example, have argued that a direct positive
correlation exists between gun availability and high murder rates and suicide
rates. 57 This research probably comports with the public's general suspicion
that the proliferation of handguns-and the carrying of concealed weapons-will encourage additional gun violence.158 If these reports are true, then
public officials should be able to enact various limited regulations to mitigate
against undesirable ramifications caused by the impending repeal of Section
941.23.
Having argued that Section 941.23 in its present form clearly is
irreconcilable with the scope of the Bear Arms amendment, however, the
article's purpose is not to enter the normative debate over the wisdom of
concealed-carry legislation. After all, the disagreement about the propriety of
allowing citizens ever to carry any concealed weapons should have little
relevance in a Wisconsin court's determination whether or not to uphold
Section 941.23 as it is presently written. Such utilitarian considerations were
debated prior to ratificationof the Bear Arms amendment, but they should not
affect a court's post-ratification interpretationof the provision. According to
Professor Sanford Levinson,
what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor
them even when there is significant social cost in doing so.
If protecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal
defendants, or any other part of the Bill of Rights were
always (or even most of the time) clearly costless to the
society as a whole, it would truly be impossible to under159
stand why they would be as controversial as they are.

Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467,498; see also Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, Do Battered
Women Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 509 (1993) (considering
firearms policy from feminist perspective).
157. Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocaustsand Gun Control, 75 WASH.

U.L.Q. 1237, 1250 n.39 (1997); Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of

Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?,62 TENN. L. REV. 513 (1995).
158. See, e.g., Beau A. Hill, Go Ahead, Make My Day: Revisiting Michigan'sConcealed
Weapons Law, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 67, 72-75 (1998) (discussing public opinion).
159. Levinson, supranote 148, at 657-58.
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In the face of these public policy disagreements, though, the public's
representatives in the Wisconsin Legislature should have wide latitude in
crafting reasonable, incidental regulations of the right to carry concealed
weapons that also respect the Bear Arms amendment's broad purpose and
scope."6 Supporters of such regulations will hardly find their legislative
arsenal disarmed. No rights are absolute, and no jurisdiction has forbidden a
state's reasonable exercise of its police powers to restrict the carrying of
concealed weapons in furtherance of the public's health or safety. 6 '
Wisconsin courts considering the constitutionality of restrictions most
likely will look for guidance to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
Brandmillerv. Arreola,6 2 which indicates that governmental restrictions on
fundamental rights are permissible if the regulations are narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest. Brandmillerinvolved a challenge to anticruising ordinances enacted by several cities that prohibited motorists from
repeatedly driving past a designated traffic control point within a limited
downtown area during a limited time period. The ordinances sought to ensure
access for emergency vehicles, reduce traffic congestion and air pollution, and
remove obstructions of streets and sidewalks within the designated areas.' 63
The court announced that it would apply heightened scrutiny to the ordinances, as they burdened the fundamental but unenumerated natural right to
travel. Borrowing from First Amendment jurisprudence, the court stated that
it would uphold only those "time, place and manner restrictions" that are
narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest."6
Finding undisputed evidence that the anti-cruising ordinances furthered
these interests, the court stated that the regulations passed the compelling
burden test. Additionally, the court stated, the ordinances:

160. When the state seeks to regulate within an area covered by constitutional
restrictions, courts balancing between the individual's interest in exercising her rights and the
state's interest in maintaining health, safety or morals should resolve all close cases in favor of
the individual. Prevention of governmental encroachment, of course, is the purpose of the
constitutional provision. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
citizens will lose faith in a government that they perceive is unresponsive to their views. In the
absence of constitutional barriers, public policy disputes should be resolved through the
democratic process. See Christopher R. McFadden, Comment, Integrity, Accountability, and
Efficiency: Using Disclosure to Fight the Appearance of Nepotism in School Board
Contracting, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1999) (essential aspect of governmental
legitimacy is ability to reflect public's views and interests).
161. Cf In re Application of Wolstenholme, No. 92M-04-006, 1992 WL 207245 (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1992) (finding state's concealed weapons permit system constitutional).
162. 544 N.W.2d 894 (Wis. 1996).
163. See id. at 894-97.
164. See id. at 899-900.
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are limited in their scope to locations undisputedly affected
by the current cruising problem, and it is undisputed that
they leave open ample alternative routes to get about town
without difficulty. They prohibit only certain repetitive
driving on a specific stretch of highway, and they16 prohibit
area.
no one from driving outside of this specific
Therefore, the court found that the restrictions were narrowly tailored to
6
achieve the government's purpose, and it upheld the regulations."
Unlike rational basis review, which one federal judge has pejoratively
' 67
labeled "a judicial rubber stamp,"' heightened scrutiny holds the state to a
higher burden when assessing its measures. Assuming that the legislature can
meet this burden, it could undoubtedly impose various restrictions on the right
to carry concealed weapons. The most obvious manner would be through a
licensing system, under which citizens apply for permits from their local
sheriff and are certified to carry weapons after passing various training
6
courses, safety classes, and background checks." In addition, the time, place,
and manner restrictions authorized by Brandmilleralso remain powerful tools
for protecting public safety. The state could use its police powers to
reasonably restrict the time and manner in which concealed weapons are
carried, such as, for example, continuing to require them to be encased during
7°
vehicular travel 69 or kept in a holster when not in use or around children.
Certain types of unusually dangerous weapons might pose such a safety risk
7
that they could be outlawed.' ' Similarly, there seems to be no legislative
intent that the Bear Arms amendment should curtail or eliminate existing state
laws limiting citizens' ability to carry firearms near certain places, such as
74
taverns, 17 school zones, 173 or government buildings. All that Brandmiller
requires is that the restrictions are narrowly tailored to achieve their
compelling articulated purpose.

165. Id. at901.
166. See id. at 897, 901.
167. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.).
168. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 202.350 (1997 and Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §
62.1-04-03 (1998 & Supp. 1999).
169. See WIS. STAT. § 167.31 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
170. See id. § 948.55 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
171. See id. § 941.295 (electric weapons); Id. § 941.296 (1997) (machine guns and
automatic weapons); Id. §941.297 (imitation firearms); Id. § 941.298 (silencers).
172. See id. § 941.237 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
173.

174.

See id. § 948.605 (1997).

See id. § 941.235 (1997).
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Finally, and above all, business owners and homeowners remain free to
restrict the manner of carrying weapons upon their private property. The Bear
Arms amendment limits only the state's power, not the individual's freedom.
CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Legislature framed and sent to the voters a broadly
worded constitutional amendment that created an individual right to keep and
bear arms for defense, security, hunting, recreation, or any other lawful
purpose. It was designed to repeal and prevent the subsequent re-enactment
of unreasonable prohibitions of that right, including the state's current
sweeping prohibition of the liberty to carry concealed weapons at any time or
place or in any manner. In light of this legislative history and voter understanding of the amendment, Section 941.23 should be found unconstitutional.
In its place, however, the Legislature remains free to enact reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions that will protect the public safety while still
respecting the constitutional rights of its citizens. Thus, the Bear Arms
amendment facilitates Wisconsin's long tradition of balancing the state's need
to maintain peace and security against the individual's desire for independence and freedom, and it was a fitting way to enshrine a time-honored right at
the dawn of a new century.

